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The perspective we take on a system determines the features and properties of the
system that we focus on. It determines where we search for causes to explain the
effects on the system that we observe. It determines the terms in which we expect the
information about the system to be expressed. And it can also influence the choice
of formalism that will be used to convey the information. This paper proposes to start
making these considerations concrete in order to draw a practical benefit out of them.
1 Networks
In the context of this paper, a network – a.k.a. an interaction system – is any set of
entities/parameters that we consider as a whole for the following reason: we presume
that the changes underwent by the entities in the set are causally related to one another
and account for the global system changes that we are interested in.
Remark: An interaction system can be comprised of just one entity (the human body for
instance, as it might been seen in the light of a different culture). In this case, to explain the
system’s global state changes, the only thing we have is, precisely, the system’s global state
changes – and also the system’s environment, i.e. everything that is not the system. So to
explain the system’s global state changes by something else than themselves, we must turn
to the environment and find an external cause. In other terms, we must add to the system
a second entity (or more) that interacts with the original. Under different circumstances, the
same object might also be regarded as an interaction system comprised of several interacting
entities (e.g. the human body as seen by modern medicine). In this case, the environment is
not the only place where explanations can be sought. Finer explanations might also come from
considering alternative interactions between the different entities of the system. Gladly, since
our present representations of objects can be questioned, in neither case are we condemned
to uncovering the same sorts of explanations in the same sorts of ways.
In this paper, we will illustrate the five following observations about interaction systems.
OBSERVATION 1:
Some properties that we regard as properties of systems – properties that the systems
may have or not have – are actually properties of the way we look at the systems.
OBSERVATION 2:
A statement like “There exists no interaction between entity X and entity Y.” has
no essential meaning in itself. Its truth value is dependent on the specific level of
1
ar
X
iv
:1
61
0.
08
76
5v
1 
 [c
s.O
H]
  2
6 O
ct 
20
16
abstraction from which the system – its entities, the interactions between them – is
being looked at and defined.
OBSERVATION 3:
Incomplete data is not the only reason for the model of a real interaction system
to fail to account for existing interactions between entities of the system. Despite
the modeller’s flawless observation and formalisation of the system, some causal
relationships between entities might still be intrinsically imperceptible to him/her under
his/her current perspective.
OBSERVATION 4:
What information a formal object can provide about the real system it is meant to model,
and what uninterpretable, non-modelling information it provides on top of that, does
not just depend on the semantics associated to the formalism describing the formal
object, it also essentially depends on the relative consistency of those semantics.
OBSERVATION 5:
The semantics associated to a formal object can be decisively affected by the history
of the object and how our scientific community came to inherit it. And thus, so can the
precise definition of the object that we choose among different customary variations of
the definition, and the properties it has that we take interest in, and those we don’t.
2 Prototypes of networks
To illustrate those five observations, we are going to use a minimalist mathematical
prototype of interaction systems named Boolean Automata Networks (BANs).
I will introduce the formalism of BANs using the BAN N represented below in Fig.1.
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f1 : x ÞÑ x4 ^ p x2 _ x3q
f2 : x ÞÑ x3
f3 : x ÞÑ  x3
f4 : x ÞÑ x2 _ x3
f5 : x ÞÑ x1 _ x6
f6 : x ÞÑ x6 _ x5
Fig. 1: The BAN N . LEFT: The interaction digraph G “ pV,Aq of N . RIGHT: N ’s defining
local update functions.
N is comprised of n “ 6 entities, namely 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , and 6 , a.k.a. automata
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Each automaton i P V “ J1, nK has a variable state in B “ t0, 1u. If
2
@i P V, xi denotes the current state of i, then x “ px1, x2, . . . , xnq P Bn denotes the
current state of N . On the right of Fig.1 are listed six functions fi : Bn Ñ B. One for
each automaton i . Function fi defines the possible variations of i ’s state depending
on N ’s. In state x P Bn of N , i ’s state can change if and only if i belongs to the set
Upxq “ ti P V : fipxq ‰ xiu of automata that are unstable in x. The state of i actually
does change if: (i) it can and (ii) i is updated. For instance, in state x “ p1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1q
of N , if 1 , 2 , and 4 are updated, and 3 , 5 , and 6 aren’t, then N transitions to state
x1 “ pf1pxq, f2pxq, x3, f4pxq, x5, x6q “ p0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1q.
Formally, a BAN is defined as a set of Boolean functions N “ tfi : Bn Ñ B | i P V u
with no mention to automata updates. A BAN is therefore not a dynamical system. This
choice of definition is deliberate although nontraditional. In the literature, Automata
Networks (ANs) are usually taken to represent dynamical systems [1–20, 21–28]. Their
definitions are made to imply specific updating conditions. The notions of causality
and time are thereby fused together and a distinction is implied between (1) process
of change and (2) (result of) change – the latter being either an approximation of the
former or an observed consequence of it. The object of this paper requires to take
a less abstract view on the formalism, and not make this semantical distinction, so:
Change is anything that has observable consequence, if only the observable conse-
quence of us noticing it. Process of change is change if it has observable consequence
in itself; if it hasn’t, then it’s not something there is anything to be said about.
In agreement with the formalism of BANs, we will assume that in a BAN, all considered
changes are represented with the same status. The focus is therefore not so much on
automata states, as it is on their changes.
3 Illustrations
OBSERVATION 1:
Some properties that we regard as properties of interaction systems – properties that
they can have or not have – are actually properties of the way we look at them.
Observation 1 can be illustrated with the BAN properties of monotony and non-
monotony. A BAN is said to be monotone when the following holds for any two
of its automata i and j . If i influences j , then it always does so in the same
way: either i always influences j positively, or i always influences j negatively. In
mathematical terms this translates to the following where x¯i P Bn is the state defined
by @k ‰ i : x¯ik “ xk and x¯i “  xi. By definition, in a monotone BAN, for any i, j P V
such that pi, jq P A, i.e. such that the Conjunctive Normal Form of fjpxq depends on xi:
either @x P Bn, xi “ 1 ñ fjpxq ě fjpx¯iq, or @x P Bn, xi “ 1 ñ fjpxq ď fjpx¯iq.
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Traditionally, when BANs model biological (genetic) regulation networks [12,15,29–31], they
are supposed to be monotone, like BAN N of Fig.1 and unlike BAN pN of Fig.2.
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pf1 : x ÞÑ x2 ‘ x3 “ p x2 _ x3q ^ px2 _ x3qpf2 : x ÞÑ x3pf3 : x ÞÑ  x3
pf5 : x ÞÑ x1 _ x6pf6 : x ÞÑ x6 _ x5
Fig. 2: The BAN pN . LEFT: The interaction digraph pG “ ppV , pAq of pN . RIGHT: pN ’s defining
local update functions.
Despite BAN pN being non-monotone, it is the exact representation of what we see of
the monotone BAN N in some circumstances.
Imagine that there exists a real system in nature that works exactly like the monotone
BAN N of Fig.1 does. Call the real system N too. Imagine that we human observers
of reality are observingN in action, and at the time we are doing that, for some reason,
parts of N are behaving rhythmically: state changes of 1 and 4 are happening
at the same frequency with a slight phase offset; everything is exactly as if 4 was
systematically updated immediately before 1 is. If we were witnessing each event
occurring in N and knew that we were, then we would have enough information to
build the representation of N given in Fig.1. But assume that deliberately, we are
considering N from a specific level of abstraction (as opposed to considering N from
the godlike perspective of the Laplacian demon that sees Everything because it is
interested in Everything). In other terms, assume we have specific interests, and
because of that we are focusing on specific attributes of N . Imagine that in the present
case, this results in us being unaware of 4 ’s existence.
NB: This does not imply a default in our observation. What it is we are looking at
in the entities i i ‰ 4 of system N might simply not exist, not make sense, or not
be measurable in entity 4 . For instance, 4 ’s state changes might represent rapid
decoding of mRNA sequences, while the state changes of the other i i ‰ 4 might
represent slower processes such the increase of protein concentrations in the cell
during the protein’s synthesis.
Every time we witness 1 change states, 4 just has. While N is taking trajectory:
4
. . .ÝÑ x “ px1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6q 4ÝÑ x1 “ px1, x2, x3, f4pxq, x5, x6q
1ÝÑ x2 “ pf1px1q, , x2, x3, f4pxq, x5, x6q ÝÑ. . .
we observers are just seeing:
. . .ÝÑ px1, x2, x3, x5, x6q 1ÝÑ pf1px1q, x2, x3, x5, x6q ÝÑ. . . .
The BAN description of a system that behaves like this is the BAN description given
in Fig.2. Under such circumstances – circumstances that constrain the temporality of
events in N together with the way we observe those events, the level of abstraction
from which we do that, and the temporality of our observations of N ’s changes with
respect to the temporality of N ’s changes – what is given of N for us to understand ispN .
In agreement with Observation 1, this shows that monotony and non-monotony are not
so much properties qualifying the interactions of a system as they are of how we look at it.
In the literature, wherever BANs are considered as stand-alone mathematical objects,
it is customary to restrict the local update functions fi to a certain class of functions for
convenience. A typical example is the restriction to functions that are expressible in
terms of a limited number of logical connectors [2,7,9,32–36, 21,22,37,38]. And as mentioned
above, the fi’s are also often restricted to functions that are expressible, on the contrary,
without certain connectors such as the ‘ (XOR) connector which makes the BAN
severely non-monotone [39,40, 37,41].
If we want the mathematical understanding we develop about mathematical repre-
sentations of ’real’ interaction systems to apply and to apply rightly, then we need to
understand the meaning of the restrictions we make when we derive this mathematical
understanding. Observation 1 shows how important it is to consider thoroughly the way
our perspective on a system and our interpretation of its representation are involved in
the properties that we build our understanding on.
OBSERVATION 2:
A statement like “There exists no interaction between entity X and entity Y.” has
no essential meaning in itself. Its truth value is dependent on the specific level of
abstraction from which the system – its entities, the interactions between them – is
being looked at.
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OBSERVATION 3:
Incomplete data is not the only reason for the model of a real interaction system
to fail to account for existing interactions between entities of the system. Despite
the modeller’s flawless observation and formalisation of the system, some causal
relationships between entities might still be intrinsically imperceptible to him/her under
his/her current perspective.
To illustrate observations 2 and 3, consider the system represented by BAN rN of Fig.3.
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rf1 : x ÞÑ 0rf2 : x ÞÑ  x3rf3 : x ÞÑ  x3
rf5 : x ÞÑ x6rf6 : x ÞÑ x6 _ x5
Fig. 3: The BAN rN . LEFT: rN ’s interaction graph rG “ prV , rAq. RIGHT: rN ’s local update
functions.
This system is actually three independent systems that we have no reasons to consider
as a whole. Automaton 1 in particular, is stuck in state 0. There is no reason for
us to consider 1 as an interacting entity interacting with other entities. Yet in some
circumstances, this BAN too is the perfect representation of what is given of system N
(of Fig.1) for us to understand.
Imagine that entities 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 of N happen to be caught in the same rhythm, and
for the same sort of reasons as before, we are unaware of entity 4 (e.g. we are looking
at interactions between varying concentrations i i ‰ 4 in the cell of different proteins,
and are thereby unable to perceive changes affecting genes like 4 ).
In N , everything is as if updates were being made in the following periodic order:
. . . 3, 2, 4,1, 3, 2, 4,1, 3, 2, 4,1 . . .
Imagine also, that we are observing the system N with regularity. But still, we are
not there absolutely each and every time something in N changes. More precisely,
imagine that in N the changes of states of entities happen very fast in comparison to
the whole duration of a period of updates p3, 2, 4,1q. Because of the that and because
of the regularity of our observations with respect to that, while N takes trajectory:
6
. . .ÝÑ x “ px1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6q 3ÝÑ x1 “ px1, x2, f3pxq, x4, x5, x6q 2ÝÑ
x2 “ px1, f2px1q, f3pxq, x4, x5, x6q 4ÝÑ x3 “ px1, f2px1q, f3pxq, f4px2q, x5, x6q
1ÝÑ pf1px3q, f2px1q, f3pxq, f4px2q, x5, x6q ÝÑ. . .
we observers of reality just see:
. . .ÝÑ x “ px1, x2, x3, x5, x6q 1,2,3ÝÑ pf1px3q, f2px1q, f3pxq, x5, x6q ÝÑ. . .
where @x P Bn:
f1px3q “ f4px2q ^ p f2px1q _  f3pxqq
“ pf2px1q _ f3pxqq ^ p f2px1q _  f3pxqq
“ pf3pxq _ f3pxqq ^ p f3pxq _  f3pxqq
“ 0.
So under these circumstances, rN accurately represents all the information we get out
of our absolutely flawless observation of N under those circumstances. And according
to this accurate representation of N , in particular there exists no interaction between
entities 1 and 5 : p1, 5q R rA.
Traditionally in the Bioinformatics literature [42–45], at best only three cases are consid-
ered for any two entities i and j of a real system N :
CASE 1: Entity i really impacts on entity j , possibly indirectly, and the model rN of N
formalises this through the arc pi, jq P rA.
CASE 2: Entity i really has no influence on entity j and the model accounts for this
through the absence of arc pi, jq R rA.
CASE 3: Entity i really impacts on entity j but the experimental data collected upstream
by biologists has failed to evidence this fact about reality. As a consequence, the
theory is failing to represent it: arc pi, jq P rA is accidentally missing from rN ’s
interaction graph rG “ prV , rAq.
In agreement with Observation 2, the example of BAN rN of Fig.3 modelling system
N of Fig.1 shows that CASE 2 doesn’t make any sense at all beyond the ‘reality’ of a
specific level of abstraction (e.g. the one at which concentrations i i ‰ 4 of proteins in
the cell are meaningful and visible, and a gene 4 isn’t).
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In agreement with Observation 3, the example also evidences there can be other
reasons – different from the “unfortunate data deficit” underpinning CASE 3 – for the
representation rN of a system N to fail to account for interactions between entities.
Now, consider again rN – the BAN of Fig.3 representing precisely what we see of
the system N of Fig.1 under the conditions described above. Under the conditions
described above, if one entity of N were to change pace, slightly slow down for
instance, even if only momentarily, then 1 might at some point take state 1. The
oscillations of 3 might even spread to 5 . Or, if 5 and 6 had been locked in state
0 until then, 1 might unlock 5 which in turn might generate the irrevocable effect of
allowing 6 to take state 1. With our perspective on N , none of this would fit with what
we know. Worse, we would be essentially unable to foresee and even understand any
of it if it happened.
OBSERVATION 4:
What information a formal object can provide about the real system it is meant to
model, and what uninterpretable, non-modelling information it provides on top of that,
does not just depend on the semantics associated to the formalism describing the
formal object, it also essentially depends on the relative consistency of the semantics.
OBSERVATION 5:
The semantics associated to a formal object can be decisively affected by the history
of the object and how our scientific community came to inherit it. And thus, so can the
precise definition of the object that we choose among different customary variations
of the definition, and the properties it has that we take interest in, and those we don’t.
The last two observations can be illustrated with the notion of “synchronism”.
A surprisingly great many occidental modellers of biological regulation networks con-
fuse synchronism in BANs with the parallel update schedule (PUS) of BANs [8,46–59].
The PUS is the update schedule originally used and made sense of by McCulloch and
Pitts in their seminal BANs [60]. The PUS forces a BAN to systematically update all
its automata so that @x P Bn, the BAN transitions from x to pf1pxq, . . . , fnpxqq P Bn.
When this makes some automata react more quickly than we would like them to,
intermediary automata can simply be added as it was originally done in the McCulloch
and Pitts BANs. Asynchronism, to which the PUS is wrongly opposed, is the update
constraint that rules out the possibility of updating more than one automaton in x.
Non-asynchronism, a.k.a synchronism is the possibility of updating more than one in x.
Formally, it is expressed by: |Upxq| ą 1 (more than 1 automata can change states in x).
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Such great tenacity for such a coarse confusion can only be explained by the fact
that wherever it is made, it does not matter, or at least, it is not made to matter.
A widespread confusion is nonetheless still is a confusion. Since it is widespread, in
agreement with Observation 5, it is much more likely to be the legacy of a community
blind spot induced by inherited semantics, than to be the responsibility of individual err.
And indeed, the blind spot around synchronism seems to be a natural effect of the
constant diverse historical reprocessing of BANs and of the way sense is made out
of them [5,60–64]. Extensive interdisciplinary interest in BANs has been reassigning
modelling responsibilities to BANs faster then it has been answering questions about
what BANs can, and actually do formalise.
The confusion between the parallel update schedule and the notion of synchronism
results in:
(1) The neglect of all intermediary updating possibilities that neither rule out syn-
chronism altogether, nor rule out asynchronism altogether (around 2153`2153 in
the case of BAN N ˚ of Fig.4), and
(2) Research being confined to frameworks in which synchronism is never consid-
ered independently of the other very strong characteristic features of the PUS
(e.g. determinism, periodicity) for the reason that in those frameworks, it cannot be.
. . .1 2 3 4 5 6 151 152 153
- --- - -- - -
Fig. 4: The interaction graph G˚ of BAN N ˚ “ tfi : x ÞÑ  xi, @i P J1, 153Ku.
The disregard synchronism owes in particular to its misguided association with de-
terminism, is aggravated by two assumptions commonly used to motivate an asyn-
chronous updating in some communities that are interested in modelling genetic
regulation with (B)ANs [65]:
(1) Simultaneity in nature is highly fortuitous, and
(2) Simultaneity in nature maps bijectively onto synchronism in (B)ANs.
The notion of simultaneity implied in these assumptions requires a notion of “objective
time” to make sense. A priori, in BANs, it doesn’t. At least not spontaneously. What
synchronism in BANs conveys is the absence of a causal relation:
Synchronously possible events are events that don’t need one another to occur.
So the relation of synchronism relates possible events without specifying anything
about how these events are otherwise related – that is, how they are related otherwise
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than by the relation created by their synchronous possibility. In particular, knowing only
that events A and B can occur synchronously, means: not knowing what effect the
occurrence of A might have on B and vice versa1. Forcing asynchronism in BANs –
i.e. forcing asynchronism in x, @x P Bn despite |Upxq| ą 1 possibly being true in some
x – contradicts the fact mentioned above (“In BANs synchronously possible events
are events that don’t need one another to occur”). To rule out the possibility of the
synchronous occurrences of possible events by imposing asynchronous updatings, is
to assume that the occurrence of any event prevents the occurrence of all other that are
also possible – or else that the model conveys the causality that we expect very poorly.
In an asynchronous BAN, automata that find themselves synchronously unstable are
therefore necessarily automata that have the ability of influencing each other. For the
BAN N ˚ of Fig.4, this means that 23256 arcs are missing from G˚. This inconsistency
between what we want the BAN to mean and what we want its constituent updating
schedule to mean squarely dismantles the intrinsically discrete modelling capacity
of the mathematical formalism of BANs and severely stakes the relevance of any
information we might subsequently draw out of it about a real system. In agreement
with Observation 4, this shows that overloading formalism with incompatible semantics
is generally not innocuous.
4 Conclusion
The observations and examples given above call for a shift of attention from specifics
and realism to definition and consistency. They show the need for us to systematically
endeavour to refine and update our scientific views so that instead of speaking of
theory and formalism as opposed to reality and nature, we rather speak of objects
that are abstractions of one another in a sense of the term “abstraction” that we can
actually formally explicit.
A characteristic strength (and beauty) of science is its ability and tradition of tackling
problems and questions through many different angles. Science does not especially
aspire at a one-dimensional history of science-making. Different perspectives currently
upheld by different contemporary scientific communities may co-exist. They don’t
need to mutually invalidate one another since science doesn’t especially need a single
consistent “survivor scientific perspective” to be selected in the end. So if science-
making presently makes sense in itself, then the same way, having different scientific
communities upholding different scientific perspectives on the same objects must
1This absence of information conveyed by the relation of synchronism is a typical example of absence
of information traditionally getting outshined by specialised knowledge and the assumptions inspired
by specialised knowledge. If anything, what this absence of information represents is ”wriggle room”
(see [66] Section 9). And making sense out of it calls for the careful attention of Computer Science with
its fundamental ability to soundly manipulate representations of information and systems, much more
than it is calls for the other natural sciences’ specialised detailed knowledge about the complexity and
diversity of real life systems in need of modelling.
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presently make sense in itself too. We have yet to study and explicit the general
coherence there must thereby be in the present coexistence of those perspectives2.
This paper suggests that the minimalist formalism of BANs may be of value in that.
Science has been concentrating on a certain kind of information, emerging directly
from objects, from the explicit statements we make about them. The BAN examples
above suggest that if we want to rely on the representations we make for ourselves of
the objects we take interest in, then we need to have practical in-depth understand-
ing of how a piece of information’s meaning and formalisation relate to one another.
The five observations of this paper undercut the assumption that there are representa-
tions that are fundamentally more “objective” – as in more “accurate”, more “complete”
or more “realistic” – than others. In that, they undercut the necessity of restricting
ourselves to looking for new information where beacons the information we already
have precisely as we presently represent it and precisely as we presently interpret it.
Let us assume the following. (1) There is such a thing as changes of perspective that
makes sense with respect to science-making. In other terms, there are differences in
perspectives that are meaningful in science. (2) A change of perspectives on object O,
from perspective A to perspective B, does not systematically result from acquiring new
information about O under A and simply increasing the set of features we take into
account when we consider O. In other terms, the difference between two perspectives
on the same object is not necessarily information explicitly expressed about that object.
And if it’s not then it raises the following question about the new information we get
on O as a result of seeing O with perspective B instead of perspective A. Other than
waiting for a fortuitous change of perspective, concentrating on clearing data deficits in
the meantime at the risk of ending up mislead by a series of questions and answers
that only are relevant under a perspective that isn’t . . . How do we access this new
information on O given that it is not (fully) dependent on what we know of O under A?
This paper suggests that a first step to answer this question is to tame implicit in-
formation of the kind that explains how BANs pN and rN of Fig.2 and Fig.3 can both
2Incidentally, this differs significantly from what the academic trend of interdisciplinarity is actually
proposing. As far as Computer Science/Biology collaborations around BANs go, interdisciplinary
operates as discipline-concatenation, prejudicially opposing a conglomerate notion of “fundamental-
/theoretical-ness” to a notion of “applied-ness”. From it ensues an effective separation between
specialists’ contributions: the work of one starts where the work of the other ends. The fatalistic
view on information lack captured by CASE 3 on Page 7 – information lack assumed to be necessarily
unfortunate and accidental – is bound to consolidate under such circumstances: the validity of the
models built by computer scientists for biologists is conditional to the quality and completeness of data
that computer scientists have no say on. Under such circumstances, making the interests of distinct
academic fields coincide rather than punctually relay each other, becomes a matter of educating the
affiliates of one discipline to the specialised knowledge of the other, or else inventing a new discipline
circumscribed to their intersection. Interdisciplinarity’s proposition therefore draws its sense out of the
fact that specialised academic knowledge reinforces interdisciplinary separation. This paper means
to emphasise issues that draw their meaning before any differences between disciplines need be
considered.
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be flawless representations of the BAN N of Fig.1, and more generally understand
the possibilities and the limits of what one given formal representation can actually
represent.
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